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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1990 decision in Employment Divison v. Smith,' the United
States Supreme Court dramatically transformed the landscape of re-
ligious liberty by holding that, as a general rule, the Free Exercise
Clause 2 "does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability'"3 even if the law
prohibits conduct that his or her religion requires or requires conduct
that his or her religion forbids. Although the general rule of Smith
thus leaves the practice of religion unprotected against restrictive
laws that are both neutral and generally applicable, the Free Exercise
Clause continues to protect religious liberty under a number of excep-
tions recognized by the Court in Smith. Most significantly, as the
Court expressly emphasized in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah,4 "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous
of scrutiny."5 Under this doctrine, underinclusive laws that fail to
pursue legislative ends with equal vigor against both religious prac-
tice and analogous secular conduct are not governed by Smith's gen-
eral rule, but instead are subject to strict scrutiny under Lukumi.6
Although I am one of many religious-liberty scholars who have crit-
icized the Court's holding in Smith,7 Alan Brownstein recently charac-
terized me as someone who has "started to make the best" of Smith by
"trying to build a shield for religious practices and institutions from
the bones the Court tossed to religious liberty in deciding that case."8
I plead guilty to this charge, and the purpose of this Article is to ana-
lyze one of those "bones"-one which, I believe, has quite a bit of meat
on it for the protection of religious liberty in the wake of Smith. In
particular, this Article will focus on a landmark pre-Smith decision,
Sherbert v. Verner,9 which was transformed-but not overruled-by
Smith and survives as an important source of situational religious
liberty.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting
the free exercise" of religion).
3. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
4. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
5. Id. at 546.
6. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise:
Smith, Lukumi and- the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
850 (2001). My description in this Article of background issues concerning the
jurisprudence of Smith and Lukumi relies heavily on my work in this prior
article.
7. See id.
8. Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 120 (2002).
9. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
II. THE TRANSFIGURATION OF SHERBERT AND
ITS PROGENY
A. The Sherbert Line of Cases
For nearly three decades prior to Smith, the Court's landmark de-
cision in Sherbert was widely understood as standing for the principle
that "government may not make or enforce any law that 'substantially
burdens' religiously motivated conduct unless it is a narrowly tailored
means of achieving a compelling state interest."'0 At least in theory,
this doctrine, sometimes referred to as the religious "conduct exemp-
tion,"11 was highly protective of religious liberty. However, as Ira
Lupu has suggested, the strict scrutiny applied by the Court in free
exercise cases was all-too-often "strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in
fact."12 In practice, the Court "only rarely sided with the free exercise
claimant,"' 3 and explained these results sometimes by denying that
the governmental scheme constituted a "burden" on religious lib-
erty, 14 sometimes by concluding that the governmental interest was
10. Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Lib-
eralism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 247 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756
(1992). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerabil-
ity of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994) ("While in other constitutional areas the compel-
ling state interest test is fairly characterized as strict in theory and fatal in fact,
in the religion cases the test is strict in theory but feeble in fact." (quoting Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972))).
13. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Doctrine, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990). McConnell describes the pre-Smith free exercise
scorecard as follows: "In fact, after the last major free exercise victory in 1972, the
Court rejected every claim requesting exemption from burdensome laws or poli-
cies to come before it except for those claims involving unemployment compensa-
tion, which were governed by clear precedent." Id. (footnote omitted). The 1972
case referred to by McConnell is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in
which the Court upheld the right of Amish parents to remove their children from
formal schooling after the eighth grade.
14. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (finding that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the United States
Forest Service from constructing a paved road on federal land that would irrepa-
rably damage a sacred site used by Native Americans for religious rituals);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting the claim that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits the federal government from requiring states to use social secur-
ity numbers in administering welfare programs). See generally Ira C. Lupu,
Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102
HARv. L. REV. 933 (1989). In this class of cases, the Court avoided applying strict
scrutiny "by holding that the harms inflicted by the challenged government poli-
cies were not of the sort that would trigger the protections of the free exercise
clause." Id. at 935.
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"compelling" and thus justified a burden on religious liberty, 15 and
sometimes because the free exercise claim was "made within the con-
fines of strictly controlled government institutions,"16 such as pris-
ons 1 7 or the armed forces.' 8
Interestingly, Sherbert'9 was the first in a line of cases that pro-
tected religious liberty in the context of unemployment benefits.20 In
Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was denied
unemployment benefits because her unwillingness to accept employ-
ment that required her to work on Saturdays triggered a provision of
the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act that disquali-
fied applicants who failed, without "good cause," to accept "suitable
work" offered to them.2 1 Sherbert's religiously motivated reason for
refraining from work on her Sabbath was not considered "good cause"
for her unemployment.
22
The Court held that the denial of benefits forced Sherbert "to
choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand."2 3 This, said the
Court, was equivalent to a fine imposed by South Carolina on Satur-
day worship and triggered strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause. 24 Although standing alone this coercive burden on religious
exercise was sufficient to trigger the protection of strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment, the Sherbert opinion contains dictum noting
that "[tihe unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbata-
rian [was] ... compounded"25 by the fact that South Carolina law
expressly protected employees who are conscientiously opposed to
work on Sunday from being required to work on Sundays.
26
15. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that
there was a compelling governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimina-
tion in education).
16. Lupu, supra note 14, at 934 n.6.
17. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding that prison officials
were not requried to accommodate the requests of Muslim inmates for scheduling
changes in order to attend religious services on Friday afternoons).
18. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the Air Force was
not required to accommodate a Jewish officer's request to wear a yarmulke
indoors).
19. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
20. Following Sherbert, the Court decided Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707
(1981), Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
21. 374 U.S. at 401.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 404.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 406.
26. Id.
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In Thomas v. Review Board,27 Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness whose
religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the manufacture
of weapons, 28 was placed in a crisis of conscience when his employer
transferred him to a department that produced turrets for military
tanks.29 When his efforts to locate a position in a nonmilitary depart-
ment of the company failed, Thomas requested a layoff, which was de-
nied by his employer. Thomas promptly terminated his employment
and applied for unemployment benefits.3O Under Indiana's unemploy-
ment compensation act, a person who voluntarily terminated employ-
ment without "good cause" was ineligible for benefits, and Thomas
was denied payments because a termination motivated by religious
conscience did not satisfy the "good cause" requirement of Indiana
law.3 1
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion followed Sherbert, holding
in Thomas that a State may not condition "receipt of an important
benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith."32 Although the
Court did nothing more than apply the Sherbert rule to a similar set of
facts in Thomas, it is significant that Indiana law, unlike South Caro-
lina's preference for Sunday over Saturday worship in Sherbert, did
not treat majority religions differently from minority religions.3 3
Thus, Thomas appears to stand clearly for the rule that a State may
not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion absent
justification under a strict scrutiny standard of review.
However, at least some members of the Court soon began to view
Sherbert and Thomas as decisions protecting religiously motivated
conduct against "unequal treatment"34 rather than as a preferred lib-
erty. For example, in Bowen v. Roy, 3 5 the Court upheld a requirement
that applicants for certain welfare benefits provide a Social Security
number as a condition of eligibility, notwithstanding their religiously
motivated objections to the use of Social Security numbers. Basically,
the Court held that there was no legally cognizable burden on the free
exercise of religion3 6 because "[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply can-
not be understood to require the Government to conduct its own inter-
nal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular
citizens." 37 In a portion of his Bowen opinion joined only by Justices
27. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
28. Id. at 709.
29. Id. at 710.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 712-13.
32. Id. at 717.
33. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 12, at 1279.
34. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263-64 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
36. See Lupu, supra note 14, at 944.
37. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699.
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Powell and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger distinguished Sherbert
and Thomas as cases protecting religiously motivated actions from
discriminatory treatment:
The statutory conditions at issue in [Sherbert and Thomas] provided that a
person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, "without
good cause," he had quit work or refused available work. The "good cause"
standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. If a state cre-
ates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of
religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent. Thus, as was urged in
Thomas, to consider a religiously motivated resignation to be "without good
cause" tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion.
3 8
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,
3 9 the third in
the Sherbert line of unemployment benefits decisions, Paula Hobbie
was employed as an assistant manager of a retail jewelry store. In
April 1984, she informed her supervisor that she was joining the Sev-
enth-day Adventist Church and thus no longer would be available for
work on her Sabbath, i.e., from sundown Friday to sundown Satur-
day. 40 Although she was accommodated for a few weeks by an ar-
rangement worked out with a supervisor, the store's general manager
informed her in June 1984 that she must either work her scheduled
shifts or resign. When Hobbie refused to go along with this ultima-
tum, she was fired. 4 1 Under Florida law, unemployment benefits are
paid only to persons who become "unemployed through no fault of
their own,"4 2 and Hobbie's claim for benefits was denied because her
religiously motivated refusal to work on her Sabbath was considered
job-related "misconduct."
43
The Court reaffirmed Sherbert and Thomas, applied strict scru-
tiny, and held in Hobbie that "[t]he First Amendment protects the free
exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert
from one faith to another after they are hired."4 4 In an interesting
footnote in the majority opinion, Justice Brennan referred to Chief
Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Bowen v. Roy and emphasized
that the Court in Bowen did not accept Burger's attempt to character-
ize Sherbert and Thomas as individualized exemption cases.4 5 Never-
theless, Brennan explained that strict scrutiny would apply in Hobbie
under either reading of Sherbert and Thomas:
Thus, even if the Court had accepted the reasoning of the Chief Justice's opin-
ion in Roy-which it did not-we would apply strict scrutiny in this case. Al-
though the purpose of the statute is to provide benefits to those persons who
38. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708 (plurality opinion).
39. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
40. Id. at 138.
41. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 443.021 (1985)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 138-39.
44. Id. at 144.
45. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 142 n.7.
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become "unemployed through no fault of their own," Florida nonetheless views
a religiously motivated choice which leads to dismissal as "misconduct con-
nected with . . . work." This scheme-which labels and penalizes behavior
dictated by religious belief as intentional misconduct-exhibits greater hostil-
ity toward religion than one deeming such resignations to be "without good
cause."
4 6
The fourth and final case in the Sherbert line, Frazee v. Illinois
Department of Employment Security,47 involved a Christian who was
denied unemployment benefits because his refusal to accept work on
Sunday was not deemed "good cause" for declining available employ-
ment. The Court upheld his free exercise claim, even though it was
based upon his personal religious beliefs and not upon a specific tenet
of an organized religious denomination.48
Thus, the Sherbert conduct exemption survived almost three de-
cades as a rule protecting the free exercise of religion as a constitu-
tional liberty entitled-at least in theory-to the protection of strict
scrutiny and the compelling interest test.49 However, this landmark
decision was destined for a Supreme Court makeover as the year 1990
approached.
B. The Transfiguration of Sherbert
Sherbert and the religious-conduct exemption found itself on the
Hogwart's Express5 O when Justice Scalia decided to revise free exer-
cise doctrine in Employment Division v. Smith.51 The problem was
that Scalia wished to use Smith to establish a new rule holding that
the Free Exercise Clause would not protect religious conduct against
restrictions imposed by neutral laws of general applicability, but Sher-
bert, which required strict scrutiny whenever any law substantially
burdened religiously motivated conduct, stood in the way.
Justice Scalia thus had to choose between two paths to get to his
intended destination in Smith. The direct path would require the
Court to overrule Sherbert despite its landmark status in the jurispru-
dence of religious liberty. Alternatively, Scalia could assume the role
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
48. Id. at 834.
49. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and SmitIL- Toward a Unified
Theory of First Amendment Exemptions From Neutral Laws of General Applica-
bility, 66 Mo. L. REV. 9, 48 (2001) (observing that all four cases in the Sherbert
line hold that "whether or not exemptions are given for non-religious reasons,
exemptions for religious reasons are constitutionally required by the Free Exer-
cise Clause").
50. The Hogwart's Express is the magical train that leaves from Platform Nine and
Three Quarters and takes Harry Potter and his fellow students to Hogwart's
School of Witchcraft and Wizardry. See J.K ROWLING, HARRY POTrER AND THE
SORCERER'S STONE 92-93 (1997).
51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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of Minerva McGonagall, Harry Potter's beloved transfiguration
teacher at Hogwart's School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, and trans-
form Sherbert into a doctrine that would not clash with Scalia's free
exercise revisionism. 5 2 He chose the latter road, and Sherbert sur-
vived Smith in a transfigured state.
According to the Court in Smith, the "Sherbert test ... was devel-
oped in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental as-
sessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct" 53 and, therefore, is
best understood as standing "for the proposition that where the State
has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling
reason."54 In other words, Smith reclassified Sherbert as a case in
which strict scrutiny was properly applied because Sherbert's relig-
ious liberty was unequally burdened by South Carolina's individual-
ized, and thus nongenerally applicable, unemployment compensation
process. The South Carolina law was not generally applicable because
an applicant was ineligible for unemployment benefits if the Employ-
ment Security Commission made a finding that he or she had failed
without "good cause" to accept "suitable work."55 Since the Commis-
sion was empowered to grant "good cause" or "suitability" exemptions
to those who had refused work for certain secular reasons, such as an
applicant's physical fitness, prior earnings, and prospects for securing
local work in his or her customary occupation, but refused to grant a
similar exemption to Sherbert when she declined employment for re-
ligious reasons, the law was tainted by a discretionary process and,
therefore, was not generally applicable.
56
Similarly, the Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah discussed a Florida animal cruelty statute that pun-
ished anyone who killed any animal "unnecessarily."57 Although this
law appeared on its face to be both neutral and generally applicable,
the Court viewed it as representing "a system of 'individualized gov-
ernmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,"' be-
cause the law required government officials to decide which animal
killings were "necessary" and which were "unnecessary" when enforc-
ing the ordinance.58 The Court in Lukumi followed Smith's reading of
52. See RoWLING, supra note 50, at 133-34. For the most detailed analysis of Scalia's
free exercise revisionism in Smith, see McConnell, supra note 13.
53. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
54. Id.
55. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1963).
56. See id. at 400 n.3 (describing the process for granting "good cause" and "suitabil-
ity" exemptions).
57. 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993).
58. Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). Although government officials considered
the killing of animals for religious sacrifice as unnecessary, they considered hunt-
ing and many other secular killings as necessary. Id.
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Sherbert and stated that the compelling interest test applies whenever
a religious-accommodation claim is denied under "circumstances in
which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are
available."
5 9
Although Sherbert is not as broad in its transfigured form as it was
in its original state, it survives Smith as an important source of pro-
tection for religious liberty in many common factual scenarios. In-
deed, in the following pages of this Article, I will attempt to show that
the Sherbert of today is supported by better reasoning and vested with
greater force than the original version of the decision.
C. A Categorical Rule: An Individualized Process for
Allocating Governmental Benefits and Burdens Is
Not Generally Applicable
The transfigured Sherbert is best understood as creating a categor-
ical rule that takes a case out of the general rule of Smith and creates
a safe harbor for religious liberty when government adopts an individ-
ualized process for allocating governmental burdens or benefits. An
"individualized process" is one in which government officials make an
"individualized . . .assessment of the reasons for the relevant con-
duct"60 and thus of a person's eligibility for a government benefit or
exemption from a governmental burden.
For example, in Sherbert, an otherwise eligible applicant for unem-
ployment compensation would be disqualified if he or she had failed
without "good cause" to accept "suitable work."61 Similarly, in Thomas
v. Review Board, an applicant who voluntarily terminated employ-
ment without "good cause" was ineligible for benefits,62 and in Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, benefits were paid only to
workers who became "unemployed through no fault of their own."63
Thus, government officials reviewing applications for unemployment
benefits were required to decide in each individual case whether an
applicant's reasons for terminating or refusing employment satisfied
the "good cause," "suitability," or "fault" standards for eligibility.
Religious liberty is particularly vulnerable under these kinds of ad
hoc, "individualized" schemes for allocating the ubiquitous burdens
and benefits of life in the modern Regulatory-Welfare State. As Chief
Justice Burger said about Thomas in his opinion in Bowen v. Roy, "to
consider a religiously motivated resignation to be 'without good cause'
tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion."6 4 More-
59. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537.
60. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
61. 374 U.S. at 401.
62. 450 U.S. 707, 712 (1981).
63. 480 U.S. 136, 138 (1987).
64. 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986).
1186 [Vol. 83:1178
20051 FREE EXERCISE & INDIVIDUALIZED EXEMPTIONS 1187
over, ad hoc processes also risk denominational discrimination, be-
cause subjective determinations may be more likely to find "good
cause" in familiar religions and "fault" in unfamiliar or minority
faiths.
As Alan Brownstein has observed, when the State establishes a
process that empowers government officials to exercise "substantially
unguided discretion in determining how and against whom [a] law
will be enforced," it is very similar to laws that allow government offi-
cials discretionary authority to license parades and other expressive
activity.65 These laws are unconstitutional because the risk is too
great that government officials will abuse this discretion by refusing
to license unpopular speech or disfavored opinions. 66 Indeed, accord-
ing to Blackstone, discretionary systems for licensing speech are a
threat to liberty because they "subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible
judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and govern-
ment."67 The same kind of risk is present when religious liberty is
made subject to the kind of ad hoc process employed in Sherbert. Be-
cause the risk of discrimination and bias is significant when public
benefits and burdens are allocated by a discretionary administrative
process, the transfigured Sherbert informs government officials exer-
cising "generally unfettered authority" that if they reject a religiously
motivated claim, they will be required to justify their decision under
strict scrutiny and the compelling interest test.
68
Although Professor Brownstein describes this rule as "extremely
narrow and generally unhelpful,"69 I believe that it is likely to be very
helpful in a potentially significant number of cases involving religious-
liberty claims against public schools, state universities, governmental
65. Brownstein, supra note 8, at 193-94.
66. "It is well established that where a statute or ordinance vests the government
with virtually unlimited authority to grant or deny a permit, that law violates the
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech." MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243
F.3d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir. 2001). The reason for this rule is obvious: when a gov-
ernment official is vested with unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a license
for an expressive activity, "the possibility is too great that it will be exercised in
order to suppress disfavored speech." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988)
(holding unconstitutional an ordinance giving the mayor "unfettered discretion to
deny a permit application and unbounded authority to condition the permit on
any additional terms he deems 'necessary and reasonable'"); Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (ruling that a "municipality may
not empower its licensing officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing or with-
holding permission to speak, assemble, picket or parade, according to their own
opinions regarding the potential effect of the activity in question on the 'welfare,'
'decency,' or 'morals' of the community").
67. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 152 (1769).
68. See Brownstein, supra note 8, at 194.
69. Id.
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employers, and state agencies. Wherever there are rules in govern-
ment schools and bureaucracies, there is almost always a process for
seeking a discretionary waiver of (or exemption from) those rules.
Thus, Sherbert and the individualized-assessment rule may provide a
strong shield of protection for the free exercise of religion in a signifi-
cant number of cases.
Under Smith and Lukumi, constitutional protection of the free ex-
ercise of religion turns on whether the challenged law is both neutral
and generally applicable. Under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause does
not protect religious liberty from restrictions imposed by "a valid and
neutral law of general applicability."70 However, under Lukumi, "[a]
law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."71 Exactly
where in this equation does Sherbert's individualized-assessment rule
fit?
As I read Smith and Lukumi, the individualized-assessment rule is
best understood as a subset of the rule that applies rigorous strict
scrutiny to nonneutral or nongenerally applicable laws. 72 I believe
that it is a categorical rule that classifies individualized exemption
processes marked by discretionary decisionmaking as per se not neu-
tral and not of general application.
Under Lukumi, the neutrality requirement is satisfied if the law in
question neither "discriminates against some or all religious beliefs"
nor targets conduct for special burdens because it was "undertaken for
religious reasons."73 Thus, strict scrutiny will only rarely be triggered
by the neutrality requirement, because it forbids laws only when their
object or purpose "is the suppression of religion or religious
conduct."7 4
The general applicability requirement is probably at least a little
more protective of religious liberty. In Lukumi, although the Court
declined to "define with precision the standard used to evaluate
whether a [law] is of general application,"75 it did provide general
guidelines for determining the boundary between general applicability
and nongeneral applicability. 76
It is very significant that the Court stated that a law that directly
targets religion falls "well below" the minimum requirement of gen-
eral applicability, 77 because this indicates that facial neutrality is a
70. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
71. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
72. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 861.
73. 508 U.S. at 532.
74. Id. at 533; see Duncan, supra note 6, at 865.
75. 508 U.S. at 543.
76. The following discussion of general applicability relies heavily upon my earlier
work on this issue. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 866-67.
77. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
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necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of generality. The neutrality
requirement is designed to forbid direct religious persecution; how-
ever, the "precise evil" prohibited by the general applicability require-
ment is the inequality that results when underinclusive legal
prohibitions are enforced against religious conduct.7 8 When society is
unwilling to impose legal restrictions on favored secular activities that
it imposes on religious practices of the same kind, that "evil" is pre-
sent and renders the constitutionality of the legal scheme doubtful.
7 9
As Justice Kennedy put it, "[aill laws are selective to some extent, but
categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the
incidental effect of burdening religious practice."80
Although it was not necessary for the Court in Lukumi to provide
the precise standard for evaluating a law's general applicability,8 1 it
did provide a very useful general formula. A law that is underinclu-
sive, in the sense of failing to restrict certain "nonreligious conduct
that endangers" state interests "in a similar or greater degree" than
the restricted religious conduct, is not generally applicable, at least
when the "underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential."8 2 In
other words, a law burdening religious conduct is underinclusive, with
respect to any particular government interest that justifies the law's
burdensome restrictions, if the law fails to pursue that interest uni-
formly against other conduct that causes similar harm to that govern-
ment interest.83
However, when the transfigured Sherbert applies, there is no need
to establish that the law is underinclusive to a substantial degree. In-
stead, strict scrutiny will apply if the religious-liberty claimant estab-
lishes two things: (1) that the State has in place an individualized and
discretionary process for allocating governmental benefits or burdens
and (2) that his or her religious-liberty claim has been rejected under
the ad hoc assessment system. In other words, Sherbert imposes a
categorical rule that treats the individualized procedure as per se not
neutral and not generally applicable. When this occurs, the case is
taken out of Smith, and the governmental decision to reject the relig-
ious-liberty claim is reviewed under strict scrutiny and the compelling
interest test.8 4
78. Id. at 545-46.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 542.
81. Id. at 543. It was not necessary for the Court to determine the precise boundary
of general applicability in Lukumi because the law struck down in that case was
a religious gerrymander that fell well below the minimum standard.
82. Id.
83. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 868.
84. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990); Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 225 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
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III. PROTECTING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE
CATEGORICAL RULE
When faced with an individualized exemption process and the cate-
gorical rule of the transfigured Sherbert, religious-liberty claimants
will usually prevail because the compelling interest test applied by the
Court to laws that fail to meet Smith's requirement of neutrality and
general applicability "is not 'water[ed] . .. down' but 'really means
what it says.'"8 5 In other words, when a government official rejects a
religious-liberty claim under an individualized system, the burden is
on the government to justify its decision by establishing that it is nec-
essary to achieve state interests of the highest order and is "narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests."
8 6
Although some commentators believe that the categorical rule will
apply only on rare occasions,87 the truth is that regulations and poli-
cies adopted by most governmental departments, state universities,
and public schools are often subject to some ad hoc process for request-
ing a discretionary waiver, exemption, or variance. Even if the policy
or regulation is neutral and generally applicable on its face, the mere
existence of the individualized exemption process triggers strict scru-
tiny when a claim for a religious exemption has been rejected under
the ad hoc system.
In the sections that follow, I propose to discuss some lower court
cases that demonstrate a thoughtful understanding of the proper ap-
plication of the transfigured Sherbert and the individualized exemp-
tion doctrine. I will also attempt to explain how that doctrine can be
used to protect religious liberty in a wide variety of cases.
A. Some Thoughtful Decisions
1. The Tenafly Eruv Case
In Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly,8 8 the Borough
had adopted a facially neutral and generally applicable ordinance that
prohibited any person from placing "any sign or advertisement, or
other matter upon any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk, or elsewhere, in
any public street or public place."8 9 Although the ordinance did not
specifically authorize Borough officials to grant ad hoc exceptions or
waivers from the posting restrictions, in fact such exceptions often
were allowed. For example, Borough officials permitted many signs
and markers to be placed on utility poles, including house number
signs, lost animal signs, and directional signs posted by local
85. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 8, at 194.
88. 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 942 (2003).
89. Id. at 151.
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churches.9 0 However, when Orthodox Jewish residents of Tenafly at-
tached lechis (thin, black strips of plastic material) to utility poles to
mark the boundaries of an eruv,9 1 Borough officials sought to enforce
the ordinance against the lechis and ordered them to be removed from
utility poles.
9 2
The Tenafly court held that although the ordinance prohibiting
posting was neutral and generally applicable on its face,9 3 the discre-
tionary and individualized exemption process took the case out of
Smith and triggered strict scrutiny when the Borough attempted to
enforce the law against the plaintiffs' lechis.
9 4
The court correctly reasoned that "in situations where government
officials exercise discretion in applying a facially neutral law, so that
whether they enforce the law depends on their evaluation of the rea-
sons underlying a violator's conduct, they contravene the neutrality
requirement if they exempt some secularly motivated conduct but not
comparable religiously motivated conduct." 95 In other words, the indi-
vidualized and discretionary decision by Borough officials to favor cer-
tain secular and religious reasons for posting items on utility poles,
but not Orthodox Jewish reasons for posting lechis, "devalued" the
plaintiffs' religion and thereby violated the neutrality principle of
Smith and Lukumi.96 The court entered a preliminary injunction bar-
ring the Borough from removing the plaintiffs' lechis.
9 7
90. Id.
91. See id. at 152. The plaintiffs' religious beliefs forbid them from pushing or carry-
ing objects outside their homes on the Sabbath or Yom Kippur. Id. However,
their faith permits them to
engage in such activities outside their homes on the Sabbath within an
eruv, a ceremonial demarcation of an area. An eruv extends the space
within which pushing and carrying is permitted on the Sabbath beyond
the boundaries of the home, thereby enabling, for example, the plaintiffs
to push baby strollers and wheelchairs, and carry canes and walkers,
when traveling between home and synagogue. Without an eruv Ortho-
dox Jews who have small children or are disabled typically cannot at-
tend synagogue on the Sabbath.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 154.
93. Id. at 167.
94. Id. at 168.
95. Id. at 165-66.
96. Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 168.
97. Id. at 178-79. See generally Shira J. Schlaff, Comment, Using An Eruv To Un-
tangle the Boundaries of the Supreme Court's Religion-Clause Jurisprudence, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 831 (2003) (discussing Tenafly and the ambiguities of the Su-
preme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence).
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2. The Case of the Acting Student Who Refused To Curse God
In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,98 the plaintiff, a member of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints ("Mormon Church"), was a stu-
dent enrolled in the University of Utah's Actor Training Program
("ATP"). At the time she auditioned for admission to the ATP, Ms.
Axson-Flynn was asked by one of the instructors whether "there was
anything she would feel uncomfortable doing or saying as an actor."9 9
She replied that she would not remove her clothing, use the name of
God or Christ in vain, or "say the four-letter expletive beginning with
the letter F."100 The plaintiffs refusal to use the words "God" or
"Christ" as profanity is based upon Exodus 20:8, which states the
Commandment forbidding believers from taking "the name of the Lord
[their] God in vain."1 0 1 She also explained that it was religiously of-
fensive to her, as a devout Mormon, to say the "F" word because it
vulgarizes a sacred marital act.10 2
As part of a class exercise in the fall of 1998, Ms. Axson-Flynn was
required to perform a monologue called Friday that called for two ref-
erences to the word "goddamn." Without informing her instructor, de-
fendant Barbara Smith, Axson-Flynn substituted different words for
the two curse words, and she received a grade of "A" for this exer-
cise.10 3 Subsequently, when Smith asked the plaintiff to perform a
scene from the play The Quadrangle as part of another class exercise,
the plaintiff objected to some of the words, "goddamn" and "fucking,"
that her part called for her to recite. When Smith learned about this
objection and about the earlier substitution of words in the Friday
monologue, she became angry and told Axson-Flynn that she should
"get over" her problem with profanity and informed her that she could
"still be a good Mormon and say these words."10 4 However, after Ax-
son-Flynn stood her ground,' Smith relented and allowed her to omit
any offensive language for the rest of the semester.1 0 5
As Axson-Flynn moved into her second semester in the ATP, the
fragile peace was violated when defendant Sandy Shotwell, the direc-
tor of the ATP, informed the plaintiff that if she could not "modify
[her] values" about offensive language, she would have to leave the
program.' 0 6 In response to this ultimatum, Axson-Flynn withdrew
from the University of Utah and enrolled in the acting program at
98. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 1281.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1282.
105. Id.
106. Id.
1192 [Vol. 83:1178
2005] FREE EXERCISE & INDIVIDUALIZED EXEMPTIONS 1193
Utah Valley State College, where she was not required to recite relig-
iously offensive language.1
0 7
Axson-Flynn sued the defendants, raising both Free Speech and
Free Exercise claims. The district court granted the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment, 0 8 but the Tenth Circuit reversed and
held inter alia that Axson-Flynn's lawsuit "raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether [the] Defendants maintained a discretion-
ary system of case-by-case exemptions from curricular require-
ments."'09
Even if the defendants' policy were accepted as a neutral and gen-
erally applicable one requiring all students to perform all class acting
exercises as written in the script,1 1o the court held that, nevertheless,
summary judgment was inappropriate because the ATP had granted a
request for an exemption from a Jewish student and excused him from
a required improvisational exercise scheduled on Yom Kippur."'
This, "coupled with the fact that [the] Defendants sometimes granted
Axson-Flynn herself an exemption from their script adherence re-
quirement,"112 raised at least a genuine issue of material fact about
whether the defendants had in place "a discretionary system of mak-
ing individualized case-by-case determinations regarding who should
receive exemptions from curricular requirements."113
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendants and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the defendants maintained a system of individualized
exemptions from curricular requirements. The court made clear that
[tihe "system of individualized exemptions" need not be a written policy, but
rather the plaintiff may show a pattern of ad hoc discretionary decisions
amounting to a "system." If we were to require the plaintiff to show that the
"system of individualized exemptions" was contained in a written policy, we
would contradict the general principle that greater discretion in the hands of
governmental actors makes the action taken pursuant thereto more, not less,
constitutionally suspect. 
1 14
The lawsuit was eventually settled when the University of Utah
agreed to adopt a policy addressing "the right of students to request a
reasonable educational accommodation based upon sincerely held re-
107. Id. at 1282-83.
108. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (D. Utah 2001).
109. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1299.
110. The Tenth Circuit held that there was a genuine issue of material fact about
whether the policy was neutral and generally applicable or merely a pretext
masking anti-Morman animus. See id. at 1293-94.
111. Id. at 1298.
112. Id. at 1299.
113. Id.
114. Id.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ligious beliefs."' 15 The University also agreed to reimburse Axson-
Flynn for tuition and fees paid during her academic year in the ATP
and to pay approximately $250,000 for her attorneys' fees.116
As Blackstone warned more than two centuries ago, discretionary
review makes religious liberty subject to the prejudices and prefer-
ences of governmental officialsll7 such as those governing the ATP.
The Tenth Circuit was correct in ruling in favor of Axson-Flynn, who
almost certainly was the victim of religious intolerance at the hands of
ATP officials. For example, in an attempt to convince Axson-Flynn to
modify her religious objections to performing scenes with profane lan-
guage, ATP officials urged her to "talk to some other Mormon girls
who are good Mormons, who don't have a problem with this."118 Gov-
ernment officials have no business instructing citizens like Axson-
Flynn on the requirements of their faith or on how to be a "good Mor-
mon." As Blackstone warned, this kind of discretionary authority
makes a government official "the arbitrary and infallible judge of all
controverted points in ... religion."119
3. The Case of the College Freshman Who Wanted To Live Off
Campus
In Rader v. Johnston,120 Douglas Rader, an eighteen-year-old
freshman student at the University of Nebraska-Kearney ("UNK"),
challenged a rule that purported to require "all full-time freshmen to
live on-campus their freshman year."12 1 The rule, however, did not
require "all" freshmen to reside on campus. Rather, exceptions were
allowed for local students commuting from their parents' homes, for
students who were nineteen years of age or older, for married stu-
dents, and "on an ad hoc basis at the discretion of [University]
administrators."'122
Rader, a devout Christian, petitioned the University for permission
to live off campus in a Christian Student Fellowship facility located
just across the street from the UNK campus. 12 3 Rader's petition to
115. Angie Welling, U., Axson-Flynn Settle Civil Rights Suit, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City), July 15, 2004, at A01.
116. Id.
117. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at 152; supra text accompanying note 67.
118. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1282.
119. BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at 152.
120. 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996). Much of this discussion revisits my earlier
analysis of Rader. See Duncan, supra note 6, at 869-72.
121. Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1544.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1544-45. The Christian Student Fellowship is a nondenominational Chris-
tian ministry that operates a "residential facility for UNK students who wish to
share 'a lifestyle which glorifies Christ.'" Id. at 1545. Rader explained his deci-
sion to eschew life in a college dormitory for that in a Christian facility as follows:
"I want to live a daily life which reflects high moral standards-those standards
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live off campus was denied, and he received a letter from a University
administrator threatening to drop him from classes "unless he signed
a housing contract to live in a residence hall."124 He then brought suit
in federal court seeking to enjoin the housing policy's enforcement
against him on the ground that it violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Is the UNK housing policy generally applicable? Although it is
widely applicable, it is also quite selective. Indeed, the court found
that when all the exceptions to the housing policy were taken into ac-
count, "only 1,600 of the 2,500 freshmen attending UNK [were] re-
quired" to live in residence halls.12 5 Moreover, these categories of
selection rendered the policy substantially underinclusive because the
subclasses of students already exempted from the on-campus require-
ment endangered the policy's purposes at least as much as would the
granting of Rader's request to live off campus in the Christian facility.
The University adopted the policy because it believed that student life
in the dormitories fostered diversity, promoted tolerance, improved ac-
ademic achievement 126 and, last (but almost certainly not least) en-
sured full occupancy of the residence halls. 12 7 These interests are
certainly legitimate, but the University was willing to forego these ac-
ademic and fiscal benefits in order to accommodate the subclasses of
freshmen covered by the exemptions. Is there any reason to think
that commuters living at home with their parents are less in need of
the social and educational benefits of dormitory life than are students
who wish to live in off-campus religious communities?128 Are occu-
pancy rates in residence halls affected when commuters and other ex-
empted subclasses are allowed to reside off campus? The UNK
which my parents and my church have instilled in me. Living in the residence
halls would make that impossible." Id. In short, he believed that the Christian
fellowship, prayer, Bible studies, and counseling available in the Christian facil-
ity were more conducive to Christ-like living than the sex, drugs, and rock-and-
roll available in the UNK dormitories. See id. at 1545-46 (noting the availability
of condoms and visits by members of the opposite sex in the dormitories, discuss-
ing a survey of students attesting to the widespread use of illegal drugs and alco-
hol in the dormitories, and describing the general "sinful" atmosphere of the
dormitories).
124. Id. at 1548.
125. Id. at 1547. In other words, more than one-third of UNK freshmen were excused
from the same housing policy that prohibited Rader from residing at the Chris-
tian facility. Id. at 1551.
126. Id. at 1548.
127. See id. at 1548 n.16 (noting that a 1992-93 manual on residential life published
by UNK stated that full occupancy was the goal of the housing policy).
128. As one student commentator has observed, "it might be argued that freshmen
who.., live at home... are in even greater need of the tolerance- and diversity-
promoting effects of dorm life" than are students, like Rader, who live with many
other students in an off-campus religious community. Kenneth D. Sansom, Note,
Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space Between Uniform and Specific Applica-
bility in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 77 TEx. L. REV. 753, 786 (1999).
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housing policy is clearly underinclusive as that term was used in
Lukumi, and the court in Rader correctly concluded that the "rule can-
not be viewed as generally applicable to all freshman students."1
29
The court applied strict scrutiny, concluded that enforcement of the
housing rule against Rader was not a narrowly tailored means of serv-
ing a compellingly important governmental interest, and therefore en-
joined the University from interfering with Rader's free exercise right
to reside in the religious facility.1
30
Suppose in Rader that the housing policy did not contain explicit
exemptions for commuters and other classes of preferred students. In
other words, suppose UNK adopted an across-the-board on-campus
housing requirement for all freshmen and granted exceptions only on
an ad hoc basis at the discretion of University administrators. 13 1 In
Rader, the record showed that UNK administrators had granted ad
hoc exceptions for medical need, 132 single parents, 13 3 a student who
wished to provide care for her great-grandmother,134 a student who
wished to drive his pregnant sister to classes at UNK, 13 5 a student
who was "mourning the death of a parent and a close friend,"136 and a
number of students whose petitions were supported by a member of
the UNK Foundation or the state legislature. 13 7 However, when Mr.
Rader filed a petition for a religious exception, his petition was
denied.138
In Rader, the court concluded correctly that UNK had "created a
system of 'individualized government assessment' of the students' re-
quests for exemptions" from the housing policy, but had "refused to
extend exceptions to freshmen who wish[ed] to live [off campus] for
religious reasons."13 9 Under the per se rule of the transfigured Sher-
bert, strict scrutiny was appropriate to protect religious claimants,
like Rader, whose claims were denied under the University's discre-
tionary administrative process.
Indeed, the facts of Rader clearly demonstrate why systems of dis-
cretionary review deserve constitutional suspicion under the Free Ex-
129. 924 F. Supp. at 1553.
130. Id. at 1558.
131. Id. at 1544, 1546-47.
132. Id. at 1546-47. For example, a student 'who was depressed and experienced
headaches" was granted an ad hoc exemption. Id. at 1547.
133. Id. at 1546-47. For example, a discretionary exception was granted for a student
"who was a non-custodial parent entitled to visitation with his son on alternating
weekends." Id. at 1547.
134. Id. at 1547.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. (referring to these VIP exemptions from the housing policy as "adminis-
trative" exceptions).
138. Id. at 1548.
139. Id. at 1553.
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ercise Clause. The administrator evaluating Rader's request for an
individualized exemption from the housing requirement, defendant
Douglas Wermedal,140 based his denial of Rader's petition in part on
his own "religious expertise" as a Baptist minister, which led him to
conclude that Rader's religious objections were "simply not true" be-
cause "there was nothing within the residence halls that would hinder
Rader's practice of religion."141 Like the university instructors in the
Axson-Flynn case instructing a student about what a "good Mormon"
could say,14 2 we see in Rader a university administrator exercising
discretionary review to decide what a practicing Christian should be-
lieve. The Free Exercise Clause should not, and does not, permit such
a discretionary system for allocating religious liberty.
4. The Case of the Native American Holy Man and His Black
Bears
In Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania,143 Dennis L. Black Hawk, a Na-
tive American "holy man,"144 wished to keep two black bears on his
land in order to conduct "spiritual ceremonies for other Native Ameri-
cans."14 5 Under the Pennsylvania Game Code, the annual permit fee
for possession of black bears was $200, a sum that was prohibitively
expensive for Black Hawk.14 6 The Pennsylvania law, however, also
provides that the fee may be waived by the director of the Penn-
sylvania Game Commission when warranted for "hardship or ex-
traordinary circumstance" so long as the waiver is "consistent with
sound game or wildlife management activities."14
7
The court held that the waiver provision created a system of indi-
vidualized and discretionary value judgments concerning what consti-
tutes "hardship or extraordinary circumstance [s]" and "sound game or
wildlife management."'148 Thus, when Black Hawk's request for a
hardship waiver was rejected, Smith did not control and strict scru-
tiny was required under Sherbert's categorical rule governing individ-
ualized exemption systems.'
49
140. Wermedal was the Assistant Director of Residence Life at UNK. Id. at 1548.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 103-04, 118 and accompanying text.
143. 225 F. Supp. 2d 465 (M.D. Pa. 2002), affd, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004).
144. 225 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 469.
147. Id. at 470 n.3.
148. Id. at 473.
149. Black Hawk, 225 F. Supp. 2d. at 473. For another consistent case involving a
second individualized exemption claim brought by Black Hawk on behalf of his
bears, Timber and Tundra, see Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 114 F. Supp. 2d 327
(M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that government officials violated Black Hawk's free
exercise rights by refusing to extend discretionary exception to Pennsylvania law
regulating destruction of animals for rabies testing to Black Hawk's bears).
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The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment enjoining
the Game Commission from charging Black Hawk the annual permit
fee, and the court explained its understanding of the individualized
exemption rule as follows: "[A] law must satisfy strict scrutiny if it
permits individualized, discretionary exemptions because such a re-
gime creates the opportunity for a facially neutral and generally appli-
cable standard to be applied in practice in a way that discriminates
against religiously motivated conduct."150 The court correctly applied
the doctrine as a per se rule that automatically triggers strict scrutiny
based upon the mere existence of an individualized, discretionary sys-
tem of exemptions. No proof of actual discriminatory application was
required, because the discretionary system "provides an opportunity
for the decision maker" to treat secular reasons for exemptions as
more important than religious reasons. 15 1
B. The Categorical Rule Applied
The categorical rule of the transfigured Sherbert should apply in a
large number of cases involving governmental policies and rules in
public schools, state universities, government employment, land use
regulation, and other cases in which government officials or agencies
allocate benefits or burdens by means of an ad hoc system of discre-
tionary application. Even if the rule being enforced against a religious
dissenter appears to apply across the board to everyone and anyone,
his or her attorney will often learn in discovery that some process ex-
ists for seeking individualized waivers or exemptions from the rule.
A system of individualized application of governmental benefits or
burdens may arise in many situations. In general, such a system ex-
ists whenever there is a process of standardless or discretionary re-
view. This process may be created by a legislature when it enacts a
restriction and then explicitly creates an individualized and discre-
tionary exemption process. Thus, in Sherbert v. Verner, the legisla-
ture denied unemployment benefits to otherwise eligible claimants
who were found to have failed without "good cause" to accept "suitable
work."152 Similarly, a governmental institution, such as a public
school, a state university, or a regulatory agency, may adopt policies
150. Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004).
151. Id. at 208.
152. 374 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1963). The "standards" created by the legislature in Sher-
bert were quite vague and thus allowed government officials "generally unfet-
tered authority" to decide on a case-by-case basis which refusals of work satisfy
the "good cause" and "suitability" requirements and which do not. See supra
notes 53-55 and accompanying text. See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993) (determining that a Florida
animal cruelty statute prohibited the killing of animals "unnecessarily" and thus
created "a system of individualized government assessment of the reasons for the
relevant conduct") (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
1198 .[Vol. 83:1178
2005] FREE EXERCISE & INDIVIDUALIZED EXEMPTIONS 1199
that expressly create an ad hoc process for "hardship" or "good cause"
exemptions.
Moreover, even if a rule or policy does not expressly create a pro-
cess for individualized exemptions, institutional rules may be (and
often are) waived by the government officials who made the rule.
School rules may be waived by the principal, or the faculty, or the
administrator into whose bailiwick the rule falls. In government em-
ployment, workplace rules may be waived by supervisors, department
heads, or other senior officials. Zoning laws, landmarking laws, and
similar land use regulations are almost always subject to individual-
ized procedures, such as special use permits and variances, for deter-
mining which parcels of land are restricted and which are
unrestricted. 153
The categorical rule should trigger strict scrutiny under the trans-
figured Sherbert whenever the government has in place a system of
individualized assessments to allocate some benefit or burden and
then rejects a claim for religious accommodation under that system.
Lawyers representing religious-liberty claimants need to be aware
that the existence of such an ad hoc system may not be obvious upon
initial assessment of a case. It may well appear at first glance that
the policy restricting the client is a neutral and generally applicable
one that applies across the board to all similarly situated persons.
For example, a state university academic policy on its face may
purport to require all students to enroll as "full-time" students, or a
153. "Land use regulation is among the most individualized and least generally appli-
cable bodies of law in our legal system." Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and
Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 767 (1999). Moreover, as Lay-
cock correctly observes, zoning laws that restrict the right to assemble on private
property for worship or religious ministry strike "at the very core of religious
liberty." Id. at 755-56. See, e.g., Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland,
940 F. Supp. 879, 886 (D. Md. 1996) (determining that the historic preservation
ordinance creates a system of individualized exemptions and that the compelling
interest test applied); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 181
(Wash. 1992) (landmark ordinance contained "mechanism[s] for individualized
exceptions"). However, some courts take the position that "any law not motivated
by hostility to religion in general, or to a particular faith, is a generally applicable
law" even if it is substantially underinclusive and even if it "is applied through
individualized assessments that [burden] churches with gross disproportion."
Laycock, supra, at 768-69. See, e.g., Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City
of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that absent evidence of
"discriminatory motive," New York City's landmarks law "is a valid, neutral regu-
lation of general applicability"). The recently enacted Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5
(2000), may also protect religious liberty whenever any governmental land use
regulation substantially burdens religious exercise. For an excellent article on
RLUIPA, see Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Un-
constitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929 (2001).
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public school may require all students to attend a "mandatory assem-
bly" on safe-sex education. But on closer inspection in the course of
discovery and investigation, the attorney may learn that the defen-
dant has implemented either a formal or an informal procedure for
granting individualized exemptions from the otherwise generally ap-
plicable policy. For example, the attorney may learn that students
who wish to attend college on a part-time basis may petition a univer-
sity official such as a dean or department chair for an ad hoc waiver of
a "full-time" enrollment rule. Or she may learn that students are rou-
tinely excused by school authorities from mandatory assemblies for
various reasons including illness, personal conflicts, or family priori-
ties such as weddings or funerals. The importance of ferreting out in-
dividualized exemptions and waivers cannot be overemphasized,
because such evidence should take the case out of Smith and place it
squarely under Sherbert and the compelling interest test.
At least in theory, the mere existence of an ad hoc "system" or pro-
cess for evaluating exemption and waiver claims-either by written
policy or by the actual practice of the defendant-should be sufficient
to trigger strict scrutiny when a religious claimant's petition for ac-
commodation is denied.154 However, in practice there will usually be
evidence of at least a few, and often many, persons who have been
granted discretionary exemptions under the ad hoc system. For ex-
ample, if the attorney checks school attendance records going back a
few years for occasions when "mandatory assemblies" were scheduled,
she will likely find that a number of students were absent on those
days due to illness, weddings, funerals or other family or personal
commitments, and for a variety of other perfectly appropriate reasons.
The existence of these excused absences from the relevant school days
(and thus from the "mandatory" assemblies conducted on those days)
is strong (perhaps conclusive) evidence that the "mandatory assembly"
policy is subject to an individualized exemption system. Therefore,
when the school rejects a request by, say, a Catholic student to be ex-
cused for religious reasons from the mandatory safe-sex assembly,
strict scrutiny applies, and the student's free exercise claim should
prevail under Sherbert and the categorical rule. 15 5
154. "The 'system of individualized exemptions' need not be a written policy, but
rather the plaintiff may show a pattern of ad hoc discretionary decisions amount-
ing to a 'system.'" Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004).
155. Of course, in the real world things might be more complicated than the hypotheti-
cal discussed in the text. For example, the school may be able to show that stu-
dents granted an excused absence were required to make up the mandatory
assembly in some way, perhaps by watching a videotape of the assembly. If this
were the case, then a court might conclude that there was not in fact an individu-
alized exemption process concerning the mandatory-assembly policy and the
Sherbert rule would not be applicable. The example in the text is offered only to
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If we assume that a State has in place a system of individualized
exemptions, some commentators argue that under the categorical rule
of Sherbert, "strict scrutiny in such cases is triggered not by the re-
fusal of the religious exemption per se, but rather by the government's
blanket refusal to consider religion as a possible reason for an exemp-
tion."15 6 In other words, these commentators take the position that
strict scrutiny only applies when the government flatly refuses to even
consider religious reasons when making individualized evaluations of
claims for exemption. This position seems clearly unsupportable,
given the facts of Sherbert and the reasons why discretionary decision-
making is constitutionally suspect.
In Sherbert v. Verner,157 Sherbert was given an opportunity, in ad-
ministrative proceedings before the Employment Security Commis-
sion, to argue that she had not failed without good cause to accept
available and suitable employment. 158 The Commission found that
her religiously motivated "restriction upon her availability for Satur-
day work" was not good cause for declining work, and thus it disquali-
fied her from eligibility for unemployment compensation.
159 It was
the Commission's denial of her claim for a religious exemption from
the eligibility requirement, not any "blanket refusal" to consider relig-
ious reasons when assessing her claim, that violated Sherbert's rights
under the Free Exercise Clause.
Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board,160 Thomas was given an
opportunity at an administrative hearing to argue that he had termi-
nated his employment for "good cause" due to his religious convictions
against producing weapons for war.16 1 There was no "blanket refusal"
to consider those religious reasons for an exemption, but rather a sim-
ple denial of his claim based upon the referee's conclusion that
"Thomas' termination was not based upon a 'good cause [arising] in
connection with [his] work.'"16 2 As Chief Justice Burger, together
with Justices Powell and Rehnquist, explained in their plurality opin-
ion in Bowen v. Roy: 163
The statutory conditions at issue in [Sherbert and Thomas] provided that a
person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, "without
suggest a possible free exercise claim, and it is not intended to provide a defini-
tive answer to all issues that might arise in such a case.
156. Scott C. Idleman, Religious Freedom and the Interscholastic Athlete, 12 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 295, 316 (2001); see also Freeman, supra note 49, at 50-51 (2001)
(arguing that strict scrutiny is triggered only by a "categorical refusal" to con-
sider religious hardship).
157. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
158. Id. at 401.
159. Id.
160. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
161. Id. at 710-12.
162. Id. at 712 (alterations in original).
163. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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good cause," he had quit work or refused available work. The "good cause"
standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. If a state cre-
ates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of
religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent. Thus, as was urged in
Thomas, to consider a religiously motivated resignation to be "without good
cause" tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion. 1 6 4
Thus, it was the refusal to grant Sherbert's and Thomas's claims for
religious-hardship exemptions, not any blanket refusal to consider re-
ligiously motivated claims, that violated the Free Exercise Clause in
those cases.
The real problem with discretionary systems of individualized ex-
emptions is not that religious reasons will not be evaluated, but rather
that such subjective review creates too great a risk of discrimination
and bias against unpopular or minority religious beliefs. When a re-
ligious claim for individualized accommodation is rejected by a govern-
ment official exercising "generally unfettered authority," this ruling is
deemed to be a per se violation of Smith's requirement of neutrality
and general applicability, and will be declared unconstitutional unless
the government can demonstrate a compelling justification for its de-
nial of the claim. This is the rule of Sherbert in its transfigured state,
and this rule should protect religious liberty in a large number of
cases in the modern Regulatory-Welfare State.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Employment Division v. Smith,165 the Supreme Court revised
its jurisprudence of religious liberty by declaring that, as a general
rule, the free exercise of religion may be prohibited by government so
long as it does so by means of a neutral law of general application.
However, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi-
aleah,166 the Court made clear that "[a] law burdening religious prac-
tice that is not neutral or not of general application" violates the Free
Exercise Clause unless the government justifies the restriction on re-
ligious liberty by passing a surpassingly strict compelling interest
test.16 7
Although the Court has not yet "define[d] with precision"'168 the
boundary line between general applicability and nongeneral applica-
bility, one clear, per se rule has been determined. Under the Court's
present understanding of Sherbert v. Verner,169 whenever the govern-
ment has in place an individualized system of discretionary assess-
ments to allocate some benefit or burden, it may not deny a claim for
164. Id. at 708 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
165. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
166. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
167. Id. at 546.
168. Id. at 543.
169. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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religious accommodation under that system without compelling
justification.
Under the revised (or what I have been calling the transfigured)
version of Sherbert, strict scrutiny will apply if the religious-liberty
claimant establishes two things: (1) that the State has in place an in-
dividualized process or system for allocating governmental benefits or
burdens and (2) that his or her religious-liberty claim has been re-
jected under the ad hoc scheme. In other words, Sherbert imposes a
categorical rule that treats the individualized procedure as per se not
neutral and not generally applicable.
This understanding of Sherbert recognizes that religious liberty is
particularly vulnerable when government officials exercise discretion-
ary authority to allocate the ubiquitous burdens and benefits of the
modern Regulatory-Welfare State. The Court has wisely grasped the
notion that such subjective review creates too great a risk of discrimi-
nation and bias against unpopular or minority religious beliefs and
practices. The rule of the transfigured Sherbert should protect relig-
ious liberty in a large number of cases concerning claims for religious
accommodation involving public schools, state universities, govern-
mental employment, zoning and land use regulation, and other gov-
ernmental rules and regulations that are subject to discretionary
permits, waivers, or exemptions.
In short, Sherbert has returned from its ride on the Hogwart's Ex-
press in a transfigured state, and in this revised form it should often
provide constitutional accommodation to religious practices against
discretionary decisionmaking in a great variety of situations.
